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Quistclose and Romalpa:  
Ambivalence and Contradiciton  
■
Lusina Ho* & Philip Smart**
(Prologue and Epilogue by Lusina Ho)
Prologue
It is with great trepidation that I publish this joint paper with Philip. The 
paper was written for a workshop at our faculty in 1998; neither author con-
sidered it significant enough to deserve posterity in published form. Sadly, 
Philip’s sudden and untimely death has provided a reason for publishing 
it, if only to provide another window to the mind of a genuine scholar and 
analytical writer one finds in him. To preserve the integrity of the paper, it 
is published in its original form, with an update in the Epilogue.
Introduction
At first glance, workshop participants may wonder what value there is in 
putting Quistclose1 and Romalpa side by side: for one involves a peculiar 
type of trust, and the other is principally concerned with retention of the 
legal title of goods sold. In fact, very rarely would the two lines of cases 
refer to each other. Notwithstanding these observations, in this paper, the 
authors seek to answer the following question: is there sufficient similarity 
between Quistclose and Romalpa that the courts should tackle the fiduciary 
relationship issues raised in such cases in a similar fashion?
The background to our inquiry is that we feel we may have identified 
some inconsistency underlying the courts’ approach in these two lines of 
cases. In Romalpa cases, arguments by a supplier of goods that a fiduciary 
relationship exists between the parties are nowadays consistently rejected 
by reference to the “reality” or “substance” of the parties’ transaction. This, 
moreover, is the situation even where the terms of the relevant contract 
* Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. I am most grateful to Kelry Loi for discussion on this pa-
per and Joey Ma for her impeccable research and editorial assistance. All faults remain mine.
** Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.
1 Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investment Ltd [1970] AC 567.
 Aluminium Industrie Vaassen BV v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 676, [1976]  All ER 55.
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make express reference to, and employ the language of, fiduciary obliga-
tions. In Quistclose cases, on the other hand, judges have at times appeared 
happy to “construct” a trust relationship out of what might normally and in 
substance be described as a commercial loan.
A Relevant Inquiry?
At the outset it must be stated that we recognise there may be those who 
feel that ours is not a relevant line of inquiry. It might be argued that any 
so-called “inconsistency” we identify is simply the inevitable consequence 
of the circumstance that the facts of and arguments raised in the Romalpa 
and Quistclose cases are very different: systematic differences in facts gener-
ate different results. Our response to any such argument is two-fold. First, 
it is not so much the results of the cases which interest us, but rather the 
approach of the courts – particularly whether or not the judge concentrates 
on the “substance” or “reality” of the transaction in question. Secondly, we 
feel we have weighty authority that supports our line of inquiry.
Although there is a large (and ever increasing) body of literature in the 
area, the article in 1980 by Goodhart and Jones in the Modern Law Review 
remains essential reading.3 Goodhart and Jones looked at the two lines of 
cases and a passage from their conclusion is worth recalling:
“The common link between all the cases is the attempt of a person who has 
paid money or supplied goods to an insolvent company to escape from the 
normally fruitless position of unsecured creditor by claiming a beneficial inter-
est in the money or goods supplied or in assets which in some way represent 
them. The court’s attitude to these attempts has been ambivalent. In some cases 
(explicitly in Kayford, and implicitly in Romalpa) the courts appear to have 
regarded the claim of the supplier as having the greater merits. In Borden, how-
ever, Templeman LJ strongly expressed the view that proprietary claims of this 
kind were objectionable … ”
Accordingly, 0 years ago - not so very long after the first cases were decid-
ed - the different attempts to employ fiduciary concepts, in circumstances 
where either goods or credit were supplied, in order to establish proprietary 
3 W. Goodhart & G. Jones, “The Infiltration of Equitable Doctrine into English Commercial Law”, 
(1980) 3 MLR 89.
 Ibid, p 511.
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claims were looked at side by side. Parallels continued to be drawn for a few 
more years. Hence Mr Justice Priestley wrote in the mid-1980s:5
“The Romalpa clauses represent an attempt by suppliers to prevent goods sup-
plied by them from becoming part of the assets of the buyer, available for all 
creditors in the event of insolvency, before they have been paid for. In their 
construction the courts have shown a readiness to acknowledge fiduciary ideas 
in ordinary sale of goods situations. Quistclose trusts demonstrate an analogous 
attempt by suppliers of credit in that (in most cases) they show an attempt 
by such suppliers to prevent moneys advanced by them becoming part of the 
recipient’s assets until some particular purpose for which the loan is made is 
accomplished. The courts in these cases too have been quite ready to use equi-
table ideas in commercial law.”
Over the last 10 or 15 years, however, Romalpa and Quistclose have nor-
mally been placed (certainly in many of the textbooks) in their own quite 
separate, distinct categories. Of course, everyone accepts that Quistclose 
and Romalpa are both forms of “quasi-security”, falling within the broad 
rubric of what may be called personal property securities law. But if one 
surveys the extensive literature in the journals, one is struck by the number 
of articles dealing with either the Romalpa or the Quistclose line of cases. 
Teasing out the similarities and differences between the two lines of cases 
appears somewhat to have gone out of fashion.6 This is, to us at least, per-
haps a little surprising. For although, writing in 1980, Goodhart and Jones 
thought that the judges’ response to the two lines of cases was ambivalent, 
in the past 0 years, such ambivalence may have been replaced by a marked 
difference in approach. On the one hand, the Quistclose line of cases has 
continued to flourish - even recently recognised by the Law Lords as fall-
ing within conventional trust principles.7 On the other hand, the “fiduciary 
side” to retention of title has been to all intents and purposes obliterated: as 
Goode has recently commented, in this regard Romalpa has been explained 
away as based on inappropriate concessions by counsel.8
To sum up, the idea behind this paper is simply that, whilst in no way 
denying the very real and extensive differences between Quistclose cases 
and Romalpa cases, it is instructive to recall the approach of Goodhart and 
5 Priestley LJ, “The Romalpa Clause and the Quistclose Trust” in PD Finn (ed), Equity and Commer-
cial Relationships (Law Book Co, 1989) Ch 8, pp 9–300.
6 Although certain issues are touched upon in J. Ulph, “Equitable Proprietary Rights in Insolvency: 
the Ebbing Tide?”, (1996) JBL 8.
7 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 at p 708, per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson.
8 R. Goode, “Commercial Law in the Next Millenium” (Hamlyn Lectures, 1998), p .
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Jones and take a broader view when considering developments over the last 
decade or so. If by the end of this paper participants feel that there is some 
value in looking at the two lines of cases side by side - rather than simply 
focusing on the latest Quistclose case or the latest Romalpa case – then the 
authors’ objective will have been met. But, in addition, we will try to go 
further and broach new ground, suggesting that Quistclose and Romalpa 
may be more closely linked than has hitherto been appreciated. Indeed, 
albeit only perhaps half-seriously, it might even be suggested that the next 
development will be the “RomQuist” clause. 
Overview of the Substantive Law
The insolvency background against which Quistclose and Romalpa were de-
cided is, in general terms, relatively straightforward. A liquidator is required 
to gather in and realise all the company’s property. Any disposition of the 
company’s property after the commencement of the winding up is prima 
facie void. The position was recently re-stated in Re Polly Peck International 
plc (in Administration); Marangos Hotel Co Ltd v Stone:9
“The essential characteristic of the statutory scheme is that the liquidator or 
administrator is bound to deal with the assets of the company as directed by 
statute for the benefit of all creditors who come in to prove a valid claim … 
A question may arise whether a particular asset was or was not the beneficial 
property of the company at the date of the commencement of the winding up 
(or administration). If it is established in a dispute that it is not an asset of the 
company then it never becomes subject to the statutory insolvency scheme … 
If, on the other hand, the asset is the absolute beneficial property of the compa-
ny there is no general power in the liquidator, the administrators or the court to 
amend or modify the statutory scheme so as to transfer that asset or to declare it 
to be held for the benefit of another person.”
Thus, just as Goodhart and Jones noted (above), establishing beneficial 
ownership of the goods or money in question is the central issue.
Romalpa
S supplies goods on 30 days credit to B Ltd but, before B has paid for the 
goods, the company goes into liquidation. The contract between S and B 
contains a “Romalpa” or retention of title (“ROT”) clause. S may seek to 
9 Re Polly Peck International plc (in Administration); Marangos Hotel Co Ltd v Stone [1998] 3 All ER 
81.
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rely upon the ROT clause in an attempt to recover one or more of the fol-
lowing:
(1) the (unprocessed) goods themselves, i.e. as supplied (for example, 
leather);
() processed goods (e.g. shoes made from the leather supplied by S); 
and 
(3) the proceeds of sale of (1) and / or () above.
In relation to (1) - the goods as supplied - a “simple” ROT clause will gen-
erally be enough for the seller to retain legal ownership of the goods: for the 
intention of the parties determines when title passes and that, of course, 
is not necessarily upon delivery. But where the liquidator holds () manu-
factured items - not leather, but shoes - or (3) the proceeds of sale (of the 
leather or of the shoes) then legal title to the goods as supplied will have 
been lost: as either the original goods no longer exist (in the case of manu-
factured items and their proceeds) or title over them has already passed to 
the sub-purchaser (in the case of the proceeds of the original goods), no 
title can be “retained” by the supplier.
Accordingly, when dealing with facts involving the proceeds of sale or 
“new” (manufactured) items, sellers have sought to rely upon equitable 
principles and doctrines (in a variety of guises) in an effort to avoid being 
left as an unsecured creditor for the outstanding contract price.10 Despite 
the circumstance that in Romalpa itself the Court of Appeal was prepared to 
accept that a seller could establish beneficial ownership of the proceeds of 
sub-sales (aluminium foil re-sold by buyer) on the basis that the agreement 
between buyer and seller had established a bailment or agency relation-
ship,11 subsequent cases have adopted a far more restricted approach.1 
Romalpa has, as Goode puts it, been treated as based on inappropriate con-
cessions on the existence of the bailment relationship.13
10 It may be noted that, at the time Romalpa was decided, any attempt to rely upon common law trac-
ing would have been bound to have failed. The recent expansion of common law tracing after 
Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 3 WLR 10, and Trustee of the Property of FC Jones and Sons v 
Jones [1996] 3 WLR 70, seem to offer a ray of hope to sellers, in that common law tracing is now 
available against exchange products (such as proceeds of sale) and increase in value. However, 
this development is unlikely to be of any practical help to Romalpa sellers, for the claim following 
common law tracing is an in personam claim, and the sub-sale is always treated as authorised. See L. 
Smith, The Law of Tracing (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), pp 370–.
11 The Court of Appeal did not clearly determine the nature of the fiduciary relationship between the 
parties, although Roskill LJ leant in favour of agency (see [1976] 1 WLR 676 at p 690).
1 It has become “standard practice” for Romalpa to be distinguished on the basis of a (supposed) con-
cession by counsel that on the facts the parties were in a bailment relationship: see W. Goodhart & 
G. Jones (n 3 above), p 501, and n 53 below.
13 See n 8 above.
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The key point appears to be that, whatever the terminology found in the 
parties’ contract, the reality or substance of their relationship is a contract for 
the sale of goods. If the buyer was indeed the agent of the supplier - or other-
wise liable to account - it would follow that any profit made on a re-sale to a 
third party would accrue to the supplier. Yet, obviously, the buyer / manufac-
turer will be in business on its own behalf, not for the benefit of its suppliers. 
Moreover, the extent of any interest which a supplier is said to have in either 
manufactured goods or the proceeds of sale will be inextricably linked to the 
debt owing from the buyer to the supplier. It will be noted that in a Romalpa 
situation (unlike Quistclose, discussed below) there is no question but that 
there is a debt owing when the goods are supplied: there is a debtor / credi-
tor relationship from the outset. In real terms, if the buyer pays in full for the 
goods, thereby extinguishing any and all debts,1 the supplier has no further 
involvement or interest. Thus, to take an illustration, if the value of the pro-
cessed goods is $100,000 but the outstanding debt is merely some $0,000, 
then it is perhaps inevitable that such facts are viewed as giving rise to a 
charge over the processed goods to secure the amount of the debt.15 Such a 
charge, we all know, becomes void if not registered.16
Of course, no one is maintaining for a moment that all Romalpa cases 
are the same, or that all ROT clauses are drafted in identical terms. Nev-
ertheless, we would suggest that it would be quite unrealistic to deny that, 
particularly since Tatung17 and Compaq Computer18, the tide has very much 
turned against fiduciary arguments in this particular context. It is surely 
inconceivable that if he were speaking today Priestley J would suggest 
that the courts have “shown a readiness to acknowledge fiduciary ideas 
in ordinary sale of goods situations”.19 However hard the draftsman may 
have tried, and however much “fiduciary” terminology has been inserted 
into the contract, the courts will not be deflected from the substance of 
the parties’ relationship.
To sum up, a ROT clause is effective to the extent that legal title can be 
and is retained by a supplier of goods. This flows from the common law rule 
(now enshrined in legislation)0 that title passes in accordance with the in-
tention of the parties. On the side of equity, however, the supplier will come 
away empty-handed. The cases state plainly that fiduciary obligations will not 
1 The presence of an “all-moneys” clause does not affect the principle involved here: see passim Thys-
sen v Armour Edelstahlwerke AG [1991]  AC 339.
15 See Compaq Computers Ltd v Alercorn Group Ltd [1991] BCC 8, [1993] BCLC 60.
16 Examples of typical registration provisions can be found in the Companies Act 1985, s399 or the 
Companies Ordinance (Cap 3), s80.
17 Tatung (UK) Ltd v Galex Telesure Ltd (1989) 5 BCC 35.
18 Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1991] BCC 8, [1993] BCLC 60.
19 See n 5 above, p 30.
0 See for example, the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 19.
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readily be imported into what is essentially a contract for the sale of goods. 
Moreover, whilst it may be strictly speaking correct that a supplier may have 
some equitable interest in manufactured goods or the proceeds of sale - being 
the holder of a floating charge created by the buyer over the goods or money 
in question - that interest will almost always be worthless.1 More impor-
tantly, from the point of view of theory, the supplier only has a debt secured 
by a charge: so even if we assume that the charge has been registered (which, 
of course, does not happen) there is no fiduciary relationship between the par-
ties. From the very outset the parties stand in a debtor / creditor relationship 
and the courts will not depart from that reality.
Quistclose
Suppose S supplies money (repayable in 3 months) to B Ltd to be held at a 
designated account for the specific purpose of paying C Ltd, a creditor of B, 
but, before B has done so, it goes into liquidation. S may seek to recover the 
money itself.
In the important decision of Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments 
Ltd, Lord Wilberforce suggested that such an arrangement gave rise to “a 
relationship of a fiduciary character or trust, in favour, as a primary trust, of 
the creditors [C], and secondarily, if the primary trust fails, of the third per-
son [S]”. As his Lordship explained,3 
“when the money is advanced, the lender acquires an equitable right to see that 
it is applied for the primary designated purpose … when this purpose has been 
carried out (ie… the debt paid) the lender has his remedy against the borrower 
in debt: if the primary purpose cannot be carried out, the question arises if a 
secondary purpose (ie…repayment to the lender) has been agreed, expressly or 
by implication: if it has, the remedies of equity may be invoked to give effect to 
it, if it has not (and the money is intended to fall within the general fund of the 
debtor’s assets) then there is the appropriate remedy for recovery of a loan.”
Accordingly, even though the lender may not have expressly invoked trust 
or equitable principles, the court is quite ready to infer both a primary and a 
secondary trust or fiduciary relationship from the facts; if the money loaned 
is meant to be used for a designated purpose and kept separate from the 
borrower’s general fund.
1 The charge will likely be void for non-registration and, even if (which is unlikely) the charge were 
registered, in practice there would in all probability be prior charges which covered the property in 
question.
 [1970] AC 567 at 580.
3 Ibid, at pp 581–.
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After almost thirty years since the “Quistclose trust” was established, 
there have been significant developments in both its scope and nature. As 
to its scope, while Quistclose itself involves the common intention of the 
parties at the time the “trust” is established, subsequent decisions suggest 
that the trust can be established unilaterally by the recipient and after the 
time of payment. It is also clear that Quistclose is not limited to money 
supplied upon a loan, but is applicable to, say, purchase moneys,5 subscrip-
tion money for shares,6 and membership fees.7 Moreover, the money need 
not be kept in a separate account as such, as long as it is not intended to fall 
within the general fund of the recipient.8 In any case, the subject matter 
of the Quistclose trust need not be money, but can be a chose in action or 
other property. (In fact, Quistclose itself involves the transfer of an amount 
to the borrower’s account at Barclays Bank, not the physical delivery of 
cash. Hence, the specific property at issue is the debt against the bank held 
in the form of a deposit, which is a chose in action.)
It is apparent from this brief survey that the potential scope for invok-
ing the Quistclose trust is very wide. A Quistclose trust can arise upon any 
gratuitous or contractual transfer of property to another person for a desig-
nated purpose, as long as the property is meant to be kept separate from the 
recipient’s general assets. Of course, the courts have so far refused to relax 
the requirement of a separate fund. Thus, Lord Nicholls in Re Goldcorp9 
distinguished Re Kayford, which represents the high point of the Quistclose 
doctrine, on the basis that there was no constraint in Re Goldcorp on the 
recipient’s freedom to use the purchase money supplied. Similarly, in Re 
ILG Travel Ltd,30 Parker J held that where an express agreement provided 
that pipeline moneys received by a travel agent on behalf of a package tour 
operator was to be held on trust, only a charge in equity was created. For 
the travel agent was allowed to mix pipelines moneys with moneys held in 
its hands.
While the scope of the Quistclose doctrine is pretty much established, 
the nature of the Quistclose trust has only been recently clarified (at least 
for the time being). In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC, 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson treated the secondary trust in the Quistclose doc-
trine as a resulting trust which arose “where A transfers property to B on 
 Re Kayford Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 60; Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (in receivership) [1995] 1 AC 7.
5 Re Kayford Ltd, ibid; Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (in receivership), ibid.
6 Re Nanwa Gold Mines Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 1080.
7 Re Challoner Club Co Ltd, Times,  November, 1997. Though the court held that a trust did not 
arise in this case, it was not because the property involved was membership fees as opposed to a 
loan.
8 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (in receivership )( see n  above).
9 Ibid, pp 100–101.
30 Re ILG Travel Ltd [1996] BCC 1 at pp 3–7.
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express trusts, but the trusts declared do not exhaust the whole beneficial 
interest … ”.31 Such a ruling not only affirms the preponderant view that 
the secondary trust is a resulting trust, but also recognises the primary trust 
as an orthodox express trust. The logical consequence of this must be that 
any exchange products or profits of the original trust property, whether au-
thorised or not, shall also be subject to the trust.3
In concrete terms, suppose S supplies money to B upon a Quistclose 
trust for the specific purpose of providing funding for B to satisfy a profitable 
contract, and B exchanges the money for goods in order to manufacture 
certain products for such contract. B then goes into liquidation before the 
process has begun. The goods will then be subject to the (express and then 
resulting) trust. Alternatively, suppose the (Quistclose) money is loaned in 
HK dollars, but deposited by B in US dollars at an interest rate of 5 per cent 
per annum with a view of using the money to pay its US creditors. B then 
goes into liquidation before the payment is made, but after the Hong Kong 
Government has announced to break the peg between the two currencies 
and the value of HK dollars has dropped significantly. One would expect 
that S can recover the whole deposit in US currency together with interest, 
even though it may now be worth a lot more in HK dollars. The same con-
sequences will ensue if the above situations occur without S’s authorisation.
In sum, a supplier of credit under Quistclose terms is in a much better 
position than that of a seller of goods under a ROT clause, even though the 
latter, in effect, also supplies credit by deferring the buyer’s obligation to 
pay for the goods. The lender under Quistclose terms can pursue the trust 
analysis to recover (1) the money itself; () profits made from the money; 
and (3) the proceeds or exchange products of the money and the profits.
The trust analysis is adopted even if the parties have not expressly in-
voked it, and where the underlying transaction is in substance a loan or 
payment for a specific purpose, the performance of which is secured by 
the payor’s right to recover the amount supplied even in the event of the 
payee’s insolvency. While a court that looks at the reality of the transac-
tion might construe it as providing security for the payee’s performance of 
31 See n 7 above, p 708. See the contrary opinion in R. Chambers, Resulting Trust (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1997) Ch 3. Chambers argues that (1) the supplier of credit only has an equitable right to restrain 
the recipient from using the money otherwise than for the specified purpose, but this equitable 
right can still be called a trust in a loose sense; and () upon failure of the specified purpose, there 
is a resulting trust in favour of the lender. It is difficult, however, to see why a right to obtain an 
injunction for a breach of contract should be called “trust”, and in any case why breach of the con-
tract would give rise to a resulting trust, and not just a right to damages (where the injunction is 
unavailable).
3 If the exchange products or profits result from a breach of trust, they would be subject to a con-
structive trust, accepting always the possibility of equitable allowance or apportionment of gain 
where appropriate.
06_Essays.indd   45 5/18/09   6:58:03 PM
6 Lusina Ho & Philip Smart (009) HKLJ
the special purpose,33 the English courts have thus far been content to fit 
it, albeit uncomfortably, into trust principles. As a result, the parties are 
seen not as in a debtor / creditor relationship, but a settlor (or beneficiary) / 
trustee relationship, with all the inappropriate consequences (at least theo-
retically) of the trust.3
Points of Comparison
Both Quistclose and Romalpa were concerned with a supplier of credit or 
goods seeking to establish beneficial ownership of the property in question 
in an attempt to prevent that property being administered, as property of 
the company, in the course of insolvency proceedings. Thus, the common 
issue raised by both lines of cases is: should the courts characterise the rel-
evant transaction according to the reality of the situation, and ignore the 
suppliers’ attempt to use equitable devices to escape the consequences of 
insolvency, or should they respect the parties’ intention to “contract out” of 
the insolvency net and accordingly give effect to these devices? 
At the level of technical, legal analysis both lines of cases focus on own-
ership of the relevant property. Yet in practical, as well as economic terms, 
the courts are dealing with a (disguised) form of “security” - hence the calls 
for both lines of cases to be brought within a statutory regime for personal 
property securities registration. The extent to which Quistclose and Ro-
malpa operate in a broadly similar fashion to a “true” security interest has 
been discussed elsewhere,35 but these two forms of “quasi security” must also 
be considered in the light of modern insolvency law and practice.
When our two leading cases were decided, more than 0 years ago, wind-
ing up and receivership were the only formal options generally available to 
a company in financial difficulty. Informal workouts did take place but the 
legislative framework did little, if anything, to assist such arrangements. 
Over the last 0 years, however, there has been a move in many jurisdic-
tions towards structured procedures to encourage and facilitate corporate 
rescues. Although Quistclose and Romalpa were decided before the advent 
of the current rescue culture, both devices impact upon corporate rescue in 
broadly similar ways. For both devices, it may be argued, can be employed 
to assist a company in its attempts to obtain either finance or essential raw 
33 For a similar view, see M. Bridge, “The Quistclose Trust in a World of Secured Transactions” (199) 
1 OJLS 333; J. Hackney, Understanding Equity and Trusts (London: Fontana, 1987), p 51.
3 Such as windfalls on the part of the creditor arising from gains obtained from the amount supplied.
35 See A. Belcher & R. Beglan “Jumping the Queue” [1997] JBL 1. Note also Report of the Review 
Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (UK: Stationery Office Books, 9 June 198) (Cmnd 
8558,) (“the Cork Report”) para 163: “ … there is a considerable body of informed opinion 
which … believes that the problems arising in relation to the impact of reservation of title 
clauses on insolvency are only part of more extensive problems deriving from the unsatisfactory 
law concerning security interests in personal property.”
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materials in order to carry on trading. If suppliers of credit or of goods could 
not look to the “security” offered by the Quistclose trust or the Romalpa 
clause then, it might be maintained, those suppliers might be unwilling to 
deal with a company in financial difficulty - or only deal with the company 
on unfavourable terms. On the other hand, both Quistclose and Romalpa 
may in certain instances hinder efforts to effect a rescue. As both forms of 
“security” are not registered, it may be quite difficult for a third party lender 
to ascertain the true financial state of the company. The lender will be 
aware that what may appear in the books of the company as its property, or 
its cash at bank, may not actually be so. This may operate as a disincentive 
to involvement in any corporate rescue plan.
Moving on to more academic considerations, when we analyse Quistclose 
and Romalpa, it is plain that the arguments raised in those cases depend 
upon the co-existence in one transaction of contractual and fiduciary re-
lationships. The following observation of Lord Wilberforce in Quistclose is 
always quoted:36 “there is surely no difficulty in recognising the co-existence 
in one transaction of legal and equitable rights and remedies … ” More par-
ticularly, one is dealing with: (1) a fiduciary relationship; and () a debtor / 
creditor relationship. In the cases that have come after Romalpa the judges 
have consistently rejected the argument that the company is, at one and 
the same time, both a debtor and a fiduciary. Whereas in Quistclose cases 
the corresponding argument has proven to be acceptable; and this is so, 
even though the argument in Quistclose cases is necessarily more complex 
and, it is suggested, appears to be just as much at odds with the reality of 
the parties’ dealings. For the very basis of Quistclose is that the company is 
not – at one and the same time – a fiduciary and a debtor. Rather, the com-
pany holds the money on trust until the “purpose” is carried out – only then 
does the company become a debtor.37 Thus in Quistclose cases the fiduciary 
and debtor / creditor relationships do not co-exist (ie at one time), instead 
they follow one another: as if in series. It is suggested that, focusing on the 
substance of the transaction in a Quistclose situation, when the money is 
actually paid into the company’s bank account that would normally (and 
fairly) be called a loan – indeed even Lord Wilberforce uses the expression 
“the lender”.38 But Quistclose itself requires us to conclude that at this stage 
there is no loan (no debtor / creditor relationship). Subsequently, the fulfil-
ment of the purpose results in a process of “reverse alchemy”: the (precious) 
trust is somewhat mysteriously converted into a (base) debt.
36 Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investment Ltd, see n 1 above, p 581. 
37 As Megarry J succinctly put it in Re Kayford Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 79 at p 81: “ … One is concerned 
here with the question not of preferring creditors but of preventing those who pay money from be-
coming creditors, by making them beneficiaries under a trust.”
38 [1970] AC 567 at pp 581–, see text to n 3 above.
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Whilst we would suggest that appeals to the “reality” or “substance” of a 
transaction are often more than justified, in relation to Quistclose it has to 
be stressed that the “lender” does not stand in a debtor / creditor relation-
ship with the company, at least not until the process of reverse alchemy has 
been brought into operation upon the fulfilment of the specified purpose. The 
connection to the commercial reality of the parties’ transaction – a loan – is 
perhaps more than a little strained. 
Fact Scenario: Drawing Quistclose and Romalpa Together
Having already pointed out certain broad similarities between Quistclose 
and Romalpa, we now propose to venture upon what we believe to be new 
ground. The objective in this section of the paper is to come up with a fact 
scenario where a Quistclose trust – suitably modified – can arguably be em-
ployed to “make good” the failings of the normal ROT clause. This is done 
not (merely) to be provocative, but rather to emphasise that a “substance” 
approach is just as appropriate in relation to Quistclose arguments as it is in 
relation to ROT clauses.
Before setting out the precise details of the fact scenario, a few brief 
points concerning the scope of Quistclose must be rehearsed. Although the 
so-called “Quistclose trust” has at times been said to be restricted to a trust 
of “money”, in actuality a great many of the cases have involved not money 
but a debt. (Hence, as mentioned above, in Quistclose itself the debt owing 
from Barclays Bank to Rolls Razor was the subject matter of the dispute.) 
It is submitted that just as there may be a Quistclose trust of an intangible 
movable (ie a debt), the trust can operate in respect of a tangible mov-
able. As a matter of theory this must surely be conceivable, particularly 
as Westdeutsche tells us that Quistclose is (conceptually) an example of an 
orthodox resulting trust arising from non-exhaustion of the funds of an ex-
press trust. If the Quistclose trust involves an orthodox express trust then, 
always provided the necessary evidence is present, it is difficult to conceive 
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of any inherent reason why its subject matter cannot be movable property.39 
There is some measure of judicial authority to this end.0
Of course, our fact scenario is being used primarily to illustrate a point 
of principle. In a real case evidence of the intention to create a trust in 
the Quistclose fashion might present some difficulty. You are asked to 
assume sufficient facts to establish a basis for the relevant intention. Nev-
ertheless, if it can be accepted that Quistclose can apply as a matter of 
principle to movables, then it becomes fairly evident that Quistclose trust 
arguments may be used (in certain circumstances) where ROT clauses are 
bound to fail.1
Fact Scenario
Universal Coins Ltd (“UCL”) manufactures silver coins, medallions and 
memorabilia. The particular process of manufacture relevant for present pur-
poses involves taking “blanks” – which are unpolished, rough disks of low 
silver content - polishing the blanks and then stamping them with an ap-
propriate motif. (The more technologically minded may think of the motif 
being etched onto the blanks by a laser!) All the blanks are supplied to UCL 
by Queens Memorial Coins (“QMC”). UCL is in financial difficulty and has 
little ready finance. UCL has, however, negotiated some potentially profitable 
contracts with Purchaser to supply 10,000 Marilyn Monroe medallions (“the 
medallions”). The medallions are to be delivered to Purchaser on 0 Septem-
ber 1998, when UCL will receive payment. QMC has agreed to supply UCL 
with 10,000 blanks in order for UCL to carry out its contract with Purchaser. 
QMC is aware of all relevant facts and has insisted that the 10,000 blanks are 
not to be used by UCL for any other purpose and are to be stored separately 
39 To take an illustration (of the movable property point), let us say that a company is in the gold bul-
lion and coins business. The company is bound to deliver 100 maples to each of four customers (A, 
B, C and D) by the end of the month. The company will receive payment from the customers upon 
delivery. X supplies all the company’s maple requirements and is fully aware of the above facts. X 
and the company enter into an agreement whereby X will provide the company with the necessary 
maples - which are to be kept in a separate safe at the company’s warehouse and are not to be used 
for any purpose other than meeting its obligations to A, B, C and D. In addition, the company’s 
obligation to pay X for the coins is expressly agreed only to arise after the purpose has been carried 
out - ie after the customers have taken delivery. (Let us further assume, just to make things as clear 
as possible, that the agreement specifies that its terms will not operate as a retention of legal title 
by X, but that the company will hold the maples on trust until the specified purpose has been car-
ried through.) In other words, our facts follow the more usual type of case where X provides money 
to a company specifically to pay certain identified creditors and for no other purpose: the difference 
here being that we are dealing with gold coins, not cash or a debt.
0 Sopp v Goldcorp Refiners Ltd (in receivership), unrep., CP 1/88 (High Court of New Zealand, 17 
October 1990), per Thorp J; discussed in C. E. F. Rickett, “Different Views on the Scope of the 
Quistclose Analysis: English and Antipodean. Insights”, (1991) 107 LQR 608 at p 6.
1 Those circumstances will be where the goods supplied have been made into something else (i.e. 
processed items). The suggested device can have no application where one is dealing with proceeds 
of sale either of the goods as supplied or of the processed items. Because once the purpose has been 
achieved, it follows that the trust will end and the supplier will be left as a simple debtor.
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from all other blanks. The contract between QMC and UCL specifically 
states that QMC has supplied the blanks to UCL for the sole purpose that, in 
the course of carrying on UCL’s business in the ordinary way as a going con-
cern, such blanks will be used to make the medallions that are to be sold on to 
Purchaser. (Again, one may have to assume other facts indicating evidence to 
create a Quistclose trust.)
In accordance with the contract between UCL and QMC, the blanks 
were delivered to UCL on 10 September 1998. On the following day the 
polishing and stamping process commences and by 1 September 1998 all 
the medallions are finished. However, on 15 September 1998 UCL goes 
into liquidation. The medallions are at that time separately stored in UCL’s 
warehouse. 
Romalpa
If there were a Romalpa clause in the contract between UCL and QMC it 
is extremely unlikely that QMC would get anything. Of course, QMC could 
retain (legal) title to the blanks, but the manufacturing process has created 
a new type of property in respect of which QMC never had a legal title 
to retain. In relation to the new items (the medallions) a claim by QMC 
would almost inevitably be categorised as a charge. For QMC’s interest in 
the new items would only be present to the extent that - and as long as - a 
debtor/creditor relationship existed between QMC and UCL. If, let us say, 
the sale price was $10,000 (for the blanks) but the value of the medallions 
was $0,000, it would strongly be argued that the value added by the indus-
trial process was not in reality done for the benefit of QMC. QMC was only 
concerned with being paid for the goods it had supplied. Accordingly, in 
the type of circumstances envisaged – a claim to processed goods – a ROT 
clause will be of little use to a supplier.
Quistclose
Our fact scenario, however, has been deliberately structured to avoid there 
being a ROT clause. We are working on the assumption that property was 
supplied to the company for a specified (and restricted) purpose. The liqui-
dation has intervened and that purpose can no longer be carried out.
Starting from basic principles, UCL does not receive the property (the 
blanks) as beneficial owner but rather as a trustee under the Quistclose 
principle. Although the blanks have been turned into something else, i.e. 
the medallions, if UCL were a trustee of the blanks it cannot - by dealing 
with the trust property in an authorised and intended manner - become the 
beneficial owner of the medallions. At this stage, prior to the insolvency, 
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the specified purpose remains in operation: blanks were supplied to be made 
into medallions and subsequently sold to Purchaser.
Whilst there is no case law on Quistclose trusts involving movable prop-
erty, let alone processed items, it is perhaps instructive to look at a more 
“traditional” Quistclose arrangement. A supplies cash to a company, it 
being intended by both parties that the cash will be paid into a separate ac-
count and thereafter the company will draw cheques on that account to pay 
off certain pressing creditors. Under the Quistclose line of cases the com-
pany is, first, a trustee of the cash it receives and, later, a trustee of the debt 
it is owed by the bank. The property as supplied (cash) has in accordance 
with the parties’ intention been converted into something else (a debt). 
Nevertheless, that process - if it can be so called - does not end the trust 
and make the company the beneficial owner. Recalling what has been sug-
gested above, the same would be the case if A supplied the company with 
US dollars, which were to be converted into pounds sterling and French 
francs before paying different creditors. Here there might be an element 
of skill – and of profit – involved in the timing of the conversion from one 
currency to another.
Summary
It is suggested that there is no compelling reason why Quistclose – which 
after all involves an express trust – must be restricted to:
(1) money or debts; or
() property as originally supplied.
Theoretically speaking, we can see no reason why you cannot create a trust 
in the Quistclose fashion applying to items of movable property in general 
(including goods) and extending to whatever final items come into exist-
ence: whether the final item is exchange property or a “new” property, such 
as processed goods. (Such a trust would have a limited lifespan, existing for 
the period that the specified purpose remained unfulfilled. When the pur-
pose was carried out, the trust would be determined and the supplier would 
become a debtor in the amount of the agreed value of the goods as origi-
nally supplied.)
In relation to processed good, such as blanks becoming medallions, 
the critical argument in ROT cases simply does not apply. In ROT cases 
the supplier is at once a creditor of the company upon delivery of the 
goods. The extent of the supplier’s interest in any processed goods will 
 One could even add additional facts to the effect that in their contract UCL and QMC agree that 
the medallions would not vest beneficially in UCL but fall under the trust.
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in substance be inextricably linked to the debt between the parties; and 
this is so both in relation to the extent of the supplier’s interest and in 
respect of the extinction of that interest (eg by payment of the debt). 
The strength of this charge argument has been clearly revealed by the 
case law over the last decade.
However, when it comes to our fact scenario (and our “RomQuist” 
clause), we have the authority of the House of Lords that –  pending the 
carrying out of the Quistclose purpose – there is no debt: the parties do not 
stand in a debtor / creditor relationship. If there is no debtor / creditor rela-
tionship then any charge argument inevitably becomes irrelevant. If there 
is no debt – until the purpose has been carried out – then there can be no 
charge (securing that debt). At the time when the liquidation intervenes, 
there is simply no debt.
Practicalities
Our fact scenario is intended to be used as a way of focusing discussion 
on the theoretical issue of whether there can be a Quistclose trust in rela-
tion to goods and which extends to new products created (by the trustee’s 
efforts) from those goods. We are trying to show that Quistclose and 
Romalpa are more closely linked than has perhaps hitherto been appre-
ciated. In particular, the same fact scenario would yield different results 
depending on whether a ROT clause or the “Quistclose” trust is used. 
The response may perhaps be: “That may be all very well in theory, but it 
could not be of any practical relevance”. Reference may here be made to 
the facts in Chaigley Farms.3
A farmer supplied a company with sheep for slaughter, the sheep being 
supplied under a contract containing a more or less standard retention of 
title clause. By the time receivers were appointed, a number of sheep had 
been slaughtered but the carcasses (which had been processed in various 
ways) were still at the company’s premises. It was held, in effect, that the 
ROT clause did not extend to the carcasses, since they were new items – 
different from the (live) animals which had been originally supplied.
Now one can look at these facts from a Quistclose perspective. (Al-
though one needs to assume one additional fact, namely that the farmer 
supplied the sheep intending that the meat would be going to a purchaser 
– “Y” – and that the sheep should not be mixed with other sheep owned 
by the purchaser, if any.) If the transaction is re-cast in Quistclose terms, 
then the animals are supplied to the company for the sole purpose of be-
ing slaughtered so that the meat can be delivered to Y – no other purpose 
is contemplated. The company is expressly not allowed to re-sell the live 
3 Chaigley Farms Ltd v Crawford, Kaye and Grayshire Ltd [1996] BCC 957.
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animals or sell the meat to any other purchaser. The argument now is that 
the company held the animals on a Quistclose trust and, therefore, did not 
become the beneficial owner of the carcasses – which are held on resulting 
trust for the farmer.
Of course, you may not particularly like this argument and you may 
think of many reasons why a court would not accept that in reality the par-
ties intended to create a trust. We very much hope so. For our point is not 
that a Quistclose trust will definitely succeed in these circumstances. Our 
contention is that such examples show that Quistclose and Romalpa can 
operate – or at least be argued to operate – in very similar factual circum-
stances. The “substance” or “reality” approach should be even-handedly 
applied to both lines of cases.
Conclusion
Not too many years after Quistclose and Romalpa had been decided, Good-
hart and Jones had no difficulty in looking at the two cases side by side; 
seeing both as examples of the “infiltration” of equity into commercial 
transactions. Although the authors of this paper would not use the term 
“infiltration”, there is no doubt that both Quistclose and Romalpa chal-
lenged existing notions and were seen by many as distorting established 
doctrine. Indeed, in certain ways Quistclose could be seen as the greater 
“culprit” in this regard. For essentially in Romalpa the court interpreted or 
re-cast the facts to permit of an agency (or bailment) relationship between 
the parties. Whereas the absolute heresy lurking in Quistclose was the 
permissibility of a private purpose trust: a potentially radical departure from 
decades, if not centuries, of judicial wisdom. 
The last 0 years, however, has seen Romalpa distinguished out of exis-
tence, whilst Quistclose has appeared to remain quite vibrant. The nemesis 
of the fiduciary side of Romalpa has been “reality”: the substance of the par-
ties’ transaction. Reality, it would seem, has not yet sharply focused its gaze 
upon the Quistclose trust. If it were to do so, it would uncover: (1) a “loan” 
which is not a loan; and () the (surely more than a little unusual) concept 
of fiduciary and debtor / creditor relationships not co-existing but follow-
ing one another as if in series. But whether these two considerations fit 
with the substance of the parties’ transaction – often, in effect, a commer-
cial loan – must be very much open to question. Nor, in our opinion, is it 
 The Court of Appeal did not suggest that a conceptually new and distinct type of agency had to be 
created; their Lordships were instead allowing the facts to be “distorted” so as to be brought within 
existing agency principles. The substance approach will not permit of such distortion. 
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wholly satisfactory to maintain that Quistclose and Romalpa deal with such 
very different situations that developments in one area can have no pos-
sible bearing upon the other line of cases. In the discussion above we have 
sought to show that Quistclose and Romalpa may in fact operate in circum-
stances that are far more similar than have hitherto been appreciated.
In short, we are not arguing that the recent judgments dealing with the 
fiduciary arguments raised in Romalpa cases are wrong, nor that a Quistclose 
trust may never be found to have been created by the parties. Rather it is 
our contention that the “substance” approach developed in relation to the 
fiduciary side of retention of title should, in the future, be just as strictly 
applied to suppliers of credit as it is currently applied to suppliers of goods. 
After all, “equality is equity”.
Epilogue
In the decade that has lapsed since the paper was written, judicial attitude 
with respect to these two authorities has remained broadly unchanged, 
even though Lord Millett has explicitly observed, in Twinsectra Ltd v Yard-
ley, that the Quistclose arrangement was “akin … to a retention of title 
clause (though with a different object)”.5  Nonetheless, there are a few 
developments that might be seen as providing support for the parity of 
treatment argued in this paper. 
In the Romalpa context, the High Court of Australia had the occa-
sion to consider a proceeds clause in Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 
452 106 Pty Ltd, which sought to declare a trust over a proportion of the 
proceeds of products made from steel supplied by the seller on an ROT 
clause, and identified by reference to the amount owed by the buyer to 
the seller from time to time.6 The majority endorsed, albeit obiter,7 such 
a clause as creating a trust – as opposed to a charge – on the ground that 
the parties’ express indication of their intention (to establish a trust) 
should be respected. Significantly, the majority drew support from Lord 
Wilberforce’s exhortation in Quistclose to allow a flexible interplay of law 
and equity, in order to give effect to practical commercial arrangements, 
even if it means recognising the co-existence of legal and equitable rights 
in one transaction.8 Thus far, Associated Alloys is the only decision of the 
highest level of court that shows a greater willingness to give effect to the 
5 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [00] UKHL 1 (HL), [00]  AC 16 at p 81.
6 Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd [000] HCA 5; (000) 0 CLR 588.
7 The seller failed to prove that the buyer had received any proceeds relating to the relevant steel, 
and so was unable to show that the intended trust was constituted. 
8 Ibid, at p 6 and p 3.
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parties’ express intention to establish a trust in the Romalpa context. Sealy 
and Hooley doubt if the English courts will reach a similar conclusion.9 
This view is justified in light of past decisions in England. However, most 
recently, in re BA Peters plc, Deputy Judge Strauss of the English High 
Court relied on the controversial view of Roskill LJ in Romalpa to imply 
an agency relationship between the manufacturer and dealer of a vessel,50 
thus leaving open the possibility for the manufacturer to establish a trust 
over the proceeds of the (authorised) sub-sale. His Lordship did admit 
that this was “no easy point”.51 
In the Quistclose context, much has happened that bears on the argu-
ment made in this paper. In Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley, Lord Millett held that 
the Quistclose trust is a resulting trust right from the start, subject only to 
a power or duty on the part of the borrower to use the money for a specific 
purpose. In particular, his Lordship repeatedly emphasized that the lender 
has never parted with any of his beneficial interest in the money.5 Lord 
Millett explains, extra-judicially, that on the transfer of the money upon a 
resulting trust, the lender’s equitable interest arises for the first time.53 The 
readiness of the House of Lords in accepting the Quistclose trust as well-
established and the effort put into providing an orthodox basis for such an 
arrangement provide a stark contrast to the judicial hostility to invoking 
the trust in Romalpa arrangements.5 In light of Lord Millett’s observation 
that the Quistclose trust is akin to a Romalpa arrangement, it seems impru-
dent to dismiss outright the use of the trust in a commercial contract for the 
sale and purchase of goods. 
Understandably, there will be more practical and evidential hurdles in 
establishing a trust in the context of sale of goods than in loans. Whereas 
the Quistclose trust arises from the outset when the money is transferred 
to the borrower for a specific purpose that entails segregation of the assets, 
9 L. S. Sealy & R. J. A. Hooley, Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials, th edn, 009 (London: 
Oxford University Press) p 69.  Attempts in England to create a trust over the proceeds of goods 
supplied on an ROT clause has been treated as creating a registrable charge in substance: Re Bond 
Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 8.  Associated Alloys has also been criticized as a “jurisprudential dead end”: P. 
M. Spink & C. A. Ong, “Substance versus Form: Anglo-Australian Perspectives on Title Financing 
Transactions” [00] CLJ 199 at p 3.
50 re BA Peters plc [008] EWHC 05, [008] BPIR at p 85.
51 See n 50 above, p 87 and p 9.
5 See n 5 above, pp 96– 97 and p100.
53 See P. Millett, “Proprietary Restitution” in J. Edelman & S. Degeling (eds), Equity in Commercial 
Law (Pyrmont, NSW: Law Book Co., 005) Ch 1 at p 30, n 30 above, referring to Westdeutsche 
Landesbanke Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (HL). The lender does 
not retain the beneficial title while passing the legal title, for an absolute owner does not possess an 
equitable interest to be retained.
5 For the view that Lord Millett has shown a willingness to depart from traditional principles of trust 
to justify the Quistclose trust, see J. Penner, “Lord Millett’s Analysis” in W. Swadling (ed.) The 
Quistclose Trust, 00 (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd) Ch 3.
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a seller in an ROT arrangement typically retains title (both legal and eq-
uitable) to the goods until full payment of the relevant sums. At this stage, 
no trust is involved; the buyer is free to deal with the goods in the ordinary 
course of business, including to destroy them in the manufacturing process 
or to sell them. In seeking to attach a trust – at a later stage – to the sub-
sale proceeds, there needs to be sufficient evidence that a buyer is in fact 
intended to sell as a fiduciary agent or bailee and thus receives the proceeds 
on account of the seller,55 or is intended to hold the proceeds on trust.56 
Moreover, given the lack of initial segregation of the goods in an ROT ar-
rangement, and the invocation of the trust over the proceeds rather than 
the original goods, the need to overcome difficulties of tracing will be much 
greater as compared to a typical Quistclose arrangement.57 The authors ac-
cept that, as a result of these practical constraints, the availability of the 
trust will be much more limited in the ROT context; rather, they submit 
that, as a matter of doctrinal consistency, the courts should not desist from 
recognising the trust where sufficient evidence is found on the facts.
Conversely, if the court prefers the ‘substance’ approach it holds in re-
lation to proceeds or products of goods supplied in an ROT arrangement, 
parity suggests that a similar approach should be applied in the Quistclose 
context.  This would involve limiting the Quistclose trust to money or 
debts originally supplied, but clearly not its exchange products.  At first 
glance, it might seem heretical to conceive of a trust – whether express, re-
sulting or constructive – that only comprises of the original settled sum, but 
not also substituted assets from time to time representing the original assets. 
Whether a Quistclose trust limited in this way will be accepted by the 
courts depends on two questions: first, whether the facts of a particular 
case as interpreted upon a “substance” approach support the finding of a 
common intention to limit the trust mechanism to the original settled 
sum only; secondly, and more importantly, whether the courts consider 
such a restriction repugnant to the nature of the trust.  It is submitted that 
the answer to the first question should depend primarily on the terms of 
the loan contract as interpreted by the court.58  If the contract unequivo-
cally indicates an attempt to create a trust in substance, the arrangement 
may even be properly classified as an express trust.  In contrast, if: (a) the 
parties had only intended the recipient to hold and segregate the money 
from his general assets pending its application for the specified purpose; 
55 As in In re BA Peters plc, see n 50 above.
56 As in Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd, see n 6 above. 
57 For a compelling argument that not even a fiduciary relationship is needed to trace into the pro-
ceeds, see K. Loi, “Tracing the Future of Romalpa Cases” [008] RLR 76.
58 For support of this approach, see J. A. Glister, “The Nature of Quistclose Trusts: Classification and 
Reconciliation” [00] CLJ 63.
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(b) the parties had no intention to invest the money in the meantime; 
and (c) they had not intended to afford the transferor trust – as opposed 
to contractual – remedies in the event of misapplication of the money by 
the recipient, then a trust that is restricted to the initial settled sum ap-
propriately reflects the parties’ arrangement.  It is even conceivable that 
some Quistclose lenders only have such a limited arrangement in mind. 
Of course, a cynic would say that such a trust, if it is one at all, can easily 
be defeated by the recipient-trustee’s misapplication of the trust fund.  Be 
that as it may, as most of the Quistclose cases show, insolvency is likely to 
have intervened before the occurrence of any breach of trust.  The risk of 
abuse may be much less substantial in reality.
As to the second question about repugnancy, it raises wider issues that 
cannot be fully addressed in the present article.  As a preliminary thought, 
at the stage where the recipient-trustee still maintains the original assets in 
a segregated fund as agreed and has not expended it, this is still in line with 
the primary trust of the Quistclose trust. This is because if the recipient-
trustee becomes insolvent at this stage, the assets will not be available to 
his general creditors just as in a traditional Quistclose trust.  The objection 
rather, is as to its vulnerable nature, namely that it ceases to bind the trust-
ee once he misapplies the trust assets.  Ironically, while such vulnerability 
may render the trust unorthodox, it may provide a good fit with the nature 
of the Quistclose arrangement. After all, it avoids the proprietary overkill 
(for example, of tracing into third-party transferees) that comes with the 
imposition of trust; instead, it gives the transferor-settlor just what he bar-
gains for, namely priority against the trustee’s creditor in the event of the 
latter’s untimely insolvency before the expenditure of the original assets for 
the specified purpose.
Admittedly, a Quistclose trust in the limited form discussed above 
involves an even greater departure from orthodox trust principles than 
its well-established version. Nor do the authors advocate such a develop-
ment, at least not in the present article. But the fact that either form is 
controversial underscores the point made in this article, that the lack of 
symmetry of treatment between Quistclose and Romalpa arrangements 
calls for a thorough examination of the policies at play and the current 
approaches of the courts.
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